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Santomero and Eckles
nthony Santomero and David Eckles predict more 
consolidation in the financial services industry, but they 
remind us that there are still a number of obstacles that suggest 
that not every merger will necessarily be successful. The 
authors see these obstacles as providing room for smaller niche 
players to survive and prosper. 
In general, I agree with these conclusions. I would just like 
to provide my view on a couple of the points raised. I am quite 
skeptical about synergy and cross-sales, which remain the holy 
grail of financial services. I also see cross-industry mergers as 
being far more difficult than intraindustry mergers. This is not 
only because of the risk of cultural conflicts, but also because 
there generally are fewer opportunities for cost savings in a 
cross-industry merger. Finally, while the acquisition route is 
clearly fraught with peril, the alternative, de novo expansion, is 
equally challenging. In most financial services, I have observed 
that it is very difficult to obtain substantial market share solely 
through de novo expansion. And without such market share, 
franchise value is likely to be limited and earnings are likely to 
be less reliable.
The paper goes on to examine the public policy implications 
of further consolidation, about which I will have more 
comments later.
Kroszner 
Randall Kroszner provides an excellent description of how 
difficult it can be to achieve financial regulatory reform. I 
would certainly agree with his conclusion that the recent 
enactment of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley (GLB) Act was the 
result of a very rare alignment of interests both within the 
financial services industry and among its regulators. I am not 
sure I can even count how many times Congress has attempted, 
and failed, to repeal Glass-Steagall over the past fifteen years. 
As the paper describes quite well, GLB was successfully 
enacted only after years of technological change, innovation, 
and economic shocks had fully undermined the Depression-
era structure of the financial services industry and shifted the 
balance of competing interests. 
Lown et al.
The question we now face is, what will the financial services 
industry’s structure look like in the future? The paper by Cara 
Lown, Carol Osler, Philip Strahan, and Amir Sufi attempts to 
predict what the financial services industry will resemble post-
GLB. The study provides a very interesting analysis of 
diversification and the risk-return trade-off in financial 
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services. It concludes that mergers between banks and life 
insurance companies will produce firms that are less risky 
but no less profitable. The authors predict that such 
“bancassurance” combinations are most likely following GLB. 
Using similar analysis, they show that even other cross-
industry mergers—between banks and securities firms and 
between banks and property and casualty insurers—would 
increase bank risks only modestly. 
I agree with the authors that consolidation will continue 
within the financial services industry. While GLB may help to 
accelerate this trend, in large part I see consolidation as being 
driven by underlying factors that existed long before this 
legislation.
On the specific topic of mergers between banks and life 
insurers, my view is less sanguine than that of the authors. 
I certainly agree that diversification can reduce risk. But I am 
not as confident of the returns on such mergers. The cultural 
challenges of cross-industry mergers are substantial, and can 
lead to a merged company that is less than the sum of its parts. 
Also, our own research would indicate that the life insurance 
business today is far less profitable than banking. This is a 
significant hurdle for any bank or insurer thinking about 
combining, and it helps explain why, even eight months after 
GLB was enacted, we still have not seen the announcement of 
any U.S. bank-insurance combinations. 
Kroszner explains how the sixty-five-year-old Glass-Steagall 
regime was finally dismantled. Both Santomero and Eckles and 
Lown et al. raise questions about the implications of this 
change for firms and public policy. As a credit analyst, there is 
not much that I can say about the process by which Glass-
Steagall was dismantled, but I am required to assess its 
implications for rated institutions and for financial stability in 
general. On the firm level, I agree with Santomero and Eckles 
that there are risk-reduction benefits to greater diversification 
and that, ceteris paribus, larger and more diversified firms are 
more creditworthy. I also agree that there are nonetheless 
legitimate worries about the manageability of such complex 
enterprises. 
I could elaborate on the firm-level implications of 
deregulation, but I do not have anything particularly 
provocative or new to say in this regard. I think the papers 
cover this issue quite thoroughly.
The Public Policy Implications 
of Gramm-Leach-Bliley
Santomero and Eckles also address the implications of GLB for 
public policy in general and systemic stability in particular. 
This topic is of great interest to me, and one that I would like 
to devote the balance of my remarks to addressing. 
Santomero and Eckles conclude that “the emergence of the 
universal financial firm exacerbates the stability concerns of 
regulators.” They discuss the costs and benefits of the 
regulatory safety net: stability versus moral hazard risks. But 
they say that “the increased size of the [post-GLB] financial 
firm makes government intervention a virtual certainty, 
notwithstanding FDICIA.” 
I would like to review this issue in greater depth by talking 
about the implications of GLB for the safety net and for 
financial stability. 
The superstructure of financial regulation that we have 
today reflects the segmented structure of the financial system 
created by the New Deal in the 1930s. These structures have 
worked remarkably well in maintaining financial stability over 
the past sixty-five years. It is true that things did not go 
perfectly in the 1980s, but system stability was never 
threatened. This is because of the prudent management by the 
authorities of the financial safety net. At critical junctures, 
financial institutions—and not just big banks, but also smaller 
banks, securities firms, government securities dealers, and 
hedge funds—were not allowed to fail at times of creditor 
uncertainty and market disturbance. This was perhaps 
unfair—and it may have contributed to moral hazard—but we 
have not had a 1931-33 financial convulsion since this 
superstructure was put in place in the mid-1930s. 
It was inevitable that market forces would in time begin to 
batter against the barriers created in the 1930s and would 
attempt to erode them and, ultimately, tear them down. 
Financial firms wanted to get into each other’s segments, 
distinctions between segments were blurred by technology and 
financial innovation, and the separations appeared increasingly 
anachronistic. And so, after much debate, the walls have finally 
been torn down by GLB.
After having lived in one kind of financial world for sixty-
five years, we are now entering one that will be different. Many 
benefits will be achieved from the tearing down of these walls. 
But as Santomero and Eckles ask, will deregulation risk greater 
financial instability? 
My answer is yes. Two forces have been converging in the 
field of financial regulation over the past ten years: 1) an 
increasing discomfort with the moral hazard risks created by 
the existence of the regulatory safety net, and consequently an 
increasing emphasis on market discipline, culminating in the 
passage of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 
Improvement Act (FDICIA) in 1992, and 2) the erosion of the 
barriers between banking, which were sacrosanct until 1969, 
and the rest of the financial services industry. 
These two trends are interrelated. The more that banks
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conglomerates, the more uncomfortable market observers 
have become with deciding which parts of these conglomerates 
are protected by the safety net and which are not. Officially, of 
course, in the post-FDICIA era, no one is protected by the 
safety net except insured depositors of banking subsidiaries. 
But this is an official fiction. There is a very large list of financial 
institutions that the authorities cannot permit to fail, no matter 
what the law says. It is ironic to contemplate that, legally, the 
authorities cannot rescue Citibank or Bank of America without 
the magical three signatures, but in practice they could not 
contemplate the failure of an unregulated hedge fund. 
My point here is not to criticize the rescue of Long-Term 
Capital Management (LTCM), but to praise it. My concern is 
that the political costs of such rescues are steadily rising. The 
conservative think tanks criticize such rescues as the 
socialization of credit risk and an unwarranted government 
intrusion into the free market. Liberal think tanks criticize such 
rescues as a misuse of taxpayer money to protect rich bankers 
or Nobel Prize–winning financial speculators. I am not sure 
whether both sides realize that they are echoing the statements 
of President Hoover as he witnessed the near-collapse of the 
U.S. financial system.
Paul Krugman has argued that as the world abandons 
Keynesianism and embraces monetarism, we should not forget 
the lesson of the Depression: deflation is worse than inflation. 
Similarly, I am arguing that, as we abandon the rigid, safe, and 
predictable world of functional segmentation protected by a 
broad safety net, we should be careful not to forget the other 
lesson of the Depression: financial instability is worse than 
inefficiency and moral hazard.
I have great confidence in today’s top regulators (who did 
rescue LTCM, and took the heat for doing so). But will we 
always have people of such wisdom and courage? Might not we 
have a regulator who chooses to follow the letter of the law, and 
stands by as something big collapses? I think the risk of this is 
low, but it has been steadily rising, and GLB has added to this 
risk. 
When banking institutions were segregated from the rest of 
financial activity, it was possible to delineate and manage a 
discrete policy for banking with respect to provision of the 
safety net. The implicit contract was that, in exchange for access 
to the discount window, deposit issuance, and implicit support 
for uninsured depositors and other creditors, banks accepted 
minimum capital requirements, periodic examinations, and 
prudential supervision. Unregulated financial services firms 
received none of these benefits, but they also avoided all of the 
burdensome regulatory impediments to which banks were 
subjected. The new consensus is that this arrangement is 
inefficient and unfair, resulting in an unlevel playing field. It is 
further felt that, if the barriers between banking activities and 
financial services are to be taken down, the correct solution to 
the safety net problem is not to extend it beyond banking, but 
rather to limit it as much as possible. Consequently, official 
policy today is that no bank is too big to fail and that, should a 
big bank fail, it should be resolved using the least-cost method. 
Official policy states that since neither banks nor other 
financial services firms enjoy the government’s implicit 
guarantee, the former regulatory distinction between them has 
been ended and the banking business can now be mixed into 
financial conglomerates that are not too big to fail. 
But it is my view that this policy is predicated on the fiction 
that such financial conglomerates can be allowed to fail. At 
times of extreme financial stress, which is precisely when a 
financial conglomerate would be most likely to fail, the failure 
of such a firm would be intolerable. If you disagree with that, 
I invite you to read the congressional testimony of Chairman 
Greenspan and New York Fed President McDonough on the 
rescue of LTCM. If the authorities could not contemplate the 
failure of a hedge fund at a time of robust economic growth 
and unprecedented financial system profitability, how could 
they contemplate the collapse and liquidation of a major 
financial conglomerate at a time of financial panic or economic 
turmoil?
Why is a special safety net required for banks, such that 
some of them should be too big to fail? The reasons are: 
1) banks are illiquid and thus confidence-sensitive institutions 
by their very nature due to the maturity mismatch between 
their short-dated liabilities and their longer dated assets, 
2) their solvency is objectively unknowable to market 
participants, especially at times of panic and upheaval, 3) banks 
are subject to contagion runs during panic periods, and 4) they 
have large exposures to each other. 
Consequently, while it may be theoretically feasible to allow 
the occasional bank to fail during times of confidence and 
prosperity, without threatening financial stability, such a 
scenario is inherently unrealistic. Banks do not fail during 
periods of confidence and prosperity; they fail during periods 
of panic and recession. And they tend to fail for reasons that are 
at least somewhat cyclical and generic, such that there is 
typically not one sick bank, but several, as we had in Texas and 
New England, or in Japan in the 1990s. If one sick bank is 
allowed to default on its uninsured deposits and interbank 
liabilities, how long will it be before the run begins against the 
next weakest name? It is easy to speak of market discipline in 
theoretical terms, but it is pretty scary to confront its 
implications in a crisis.
In my opinion, many of the institutions that ultimately will 
emerge as a result of GLB will be, by and large, too big to fail. 
This fact is like the elephant at the picnic—everyone is aware of 
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constructive ambiguity around this fact. It is not necessary to 
codify it into regulation or law. But we should be careful not to 
deny it too vehemently or to prohibit it by law, or else we may 
find ourselves tripping over our own words someday. As Paul 
Krugman says, we should not need to repeat the mistakes of the 
1930s to learn the lessons of the 1930s.
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